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1. There has recently been quite a bit of interest among philo-
sophers in issues concerning whether our conduct must invariably be 
guided strictly by universal moral principles, which we apply impar-
tially in all situations, or whether favoritism of one sort or another may 
sometimes be reasonable. In fact, we do not always feel that we are 
required to be meticulously evenhanded. We treat the situation dif-
ferently when our children, or our countries, or our most cherished 
personal ambitions are at stake. In many circumstances, we think it 
appropriate and perhaps even obli~ratory to favor certain people over 
others who may be just as worthy but with whom our relationships are 
more distant; and we quite often consider ourselves similarly entitled 
to prefer investing our resources in projects or institutions to which 
we happen to be especially devoted rather than in those that we may 
readily acknowledge to have even somewhat greater inherent merit. 
The problem with which philosophers have been concerned is not so 
much to determine whether preferences of this kind are ever truly le-
gitimate as to explain under what conditions and in what way they may 
be justified. 
An example that has been widely discussed in connection with these 
issues has to do with a man who sees two people on the verge of 
drowning, who can save only one, and who must decide which of the 
two he will try to save. One of them is a person whom he does not 
know; the other is his wife. It is difficult to suppose that the man should 
make up his mind, in this situation, by tossing a coin. We are not in-
clined to be disturbed by the thought that it would be somehow im-
proper for him to put aside considerations of impartiality or fairness 
altogether and simply choose to rescue his wife. But what is his war-
rant for treating the nvo endangered people so unequally? What ac-
ceptable principle can the man invoke, which would legitimate his 
decision to let the stranger drown? 
One of the most interesting contemporary philosophers, Bernard 
Williams, suggesto; that the man already goes wrong if he thinks it is 
at all incumbent upon him even to look for a general principle from 
which he could draw the conclusion that, in situations of this kind, it 
is permissible to save one's wife. Instead, Williams says, "it might ... 
[be] hoped ... that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would 
be [just] the thought that it was his wife." If he adds to this the 
thought that in situations of this kind it is pennissibkto save one's wife, 
Williams admonishes that the man is having "one thought too many". 
In other words, there is something fishy about the whole notion that 
the man needs to find some general rule from which a reason that 
justifies his decision could be derived. 1 
2. I am very sympathetic to Williams' line of thought about this 
example. Nevertheless, I do have problems with a couple of the de-
tails. For one thing, I cannot help wondering why the man should 
have even the one thought that it's his wife. Are we supposed to imag-
ine that at first he didn't recognize her? Or are we supposed to imag-
ine that at first he didn't remember that they were married, and had 
to remind himself of that? It seems to me that the strictly correct num-
ber of thoughts for this man is zero. Surely the normal thing is that 
the man sees what's happening in the water, and he jumps in to save 
his wife. Without thinking at all. In the circumstances that the ex-
ample describes, any thought whatever is one thought too many. 
In addition, the example is seriously out offocus in a rather more 
fundamental respect as well. It acwally can't work in the way that 
Williams intends if we stipulate nothing more than that one of the peo-
ple drowning is the man's wife. Mter all, suppose that for quite good 
reasons he detests his wife. Suppose that she detests him for good 
reasons too, and that she has recently engaged in several quite de-
termined murderous assaults on him. Or suppose that it was noth-
ing but a marriage of convenience anyhow, and that they have never 
even been in the same room together except during a perfunctory 
five-minute wedding ceremony thirty years ago. Specifying merely a 
bare legal relationship between the man and the drowning woman 
appears really to miss the poinL 
So let us put aside the matter of their civil status, and stipulate in-
stead that the man in the example /mJes one (and not the other) of 
the two people who are drowning. In that case, it would indeed be 
incongruous for him to look for a reason to save that person. If he 
1 Bernard Williams, ·Persons. Character and Morality, • in his Marui I...ruJc (Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. 18. 
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loves her, then he necessarily has the reason he needs: it is simply 
that she is in trouble, and needs his help. The fact that he loves her, 
just in itself, entails that he already takes her distress as a more pow-
erful reason for going to her aid than for going to the aid of some-
one about whom he knows nothing. The need of his beloved for help 
provides him with that reason without any thought of further consider-
ations or of general rules. 
To think of such things would indeed be to have one thought too 
many, because if the man does not recognize the distress of the 
woman he loves as a particular reason to save her rather than the 
stranger, he does not truly love her at all. Loving someone or some-
thing essentially means, among other things, taking its needs and 
interests as reasons for acting to serve those interests and needs. Love 
is itself, in other words, a source of reasons. It creates the reasons by 
which acts ofloving devotion are inspired. As a matter offact, that's 
precisely how it is that love makes the world go around. 
3. This conception of the nature of love contrasts with another 
conception, according to which love is basically a response to the per-
ceived value of the beloved. We are moved to love something, on that 
other account, by an appreciation of the unique or otherwise remark-
able value that inheres in it. The appeal of its inherent value is what 
captivates us. Indeed, the idea is that we begin and that we continue 
to love it for the sake ofthat value. If we did not find it valuable, we 
would not love it. 
This may be a legitimate conception of love, but the sort of love 
that I have in mind is something else. As I understand it, love is not 
essentially grounded in any awareness or appreciation of the inher-
ent value of its object. It is quite possible that a person may be caused 
to love something despite recognizing that it actually possesses no par-
ticular value of its own at all; and it is also possible that a person may 
come to love something even despite recognizing that in its own na-
ture it is utterly bad. In that case, the love may be a misfortune; and 
it may be a still further misfortune for someone to become aware that 
what he loves has no special worth. But such things happen. 
It is true that the beloved is invariably valuable to the lover, and 
that the lover invariably appreciates its value to him. However, the 
perception ofits value is far from being an indispensable formative con-
dition of his love. The essential relationship between love and the 
value of the beloved actually goes in just the opposite direction. We 
do not love things as a result of recognizing their value and being cap-
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tivated by it. What we love acquires value for us just because we love 
it. The value derives from and depends upon the love. 
Consider the love of parents for their children. I can tell you that 
I do not love my children because I am aware of some value that is in-
herent in them independently of my love for them. The fact is that 
I loved them even before I had any especially relevant information 
about their personal characteristics or their particular merits and 
virtues. Moreover, to be candid, I do not believe that the value they 
do happen to possess strictly in their own rights would really provide 
me with a very compelling basis for considering them to have greater 
worth than many other possible objects of love that in fact I love 
much less. 
At times, we speak of people or of other things as "unworthy" of 
our love. It is unclear to me just what this is supposed to mean. Per-
haps it means that the cost of loving those things is greater than the 
benefit of doing so; or perhaps it means that loving them would be 
somehow demeaning. In any case, ifl ask myself whether my children 
are worthy of my love, my quite emphatic inclination is simply to re-
ject the question as inappropriate and misguided. This is not because 
it goes without saying that they are worthy. It is because my love for 
them is in no way a response to or based upon any evaluation either 
of them or of the consequences for me of loving them. If my child-
ren should turn out to be ferociously wicked, and if it should also be-
come apparent that loving them threatened my hope of leading a 
decent life, I might come to feel that it was in some way regrettable 
that I loved them. But I suspect that after recognizing all this, I would 
continue to love them anyhow. 
It is not because I have noticed their value that I love my children 
as I do. It is really the other way around. The reason they are so pre-
cious to me is simply that I love them so much. It is as a consequence 
of my love for them that they have acquired, in my eyes, a value that 
othenvise they would quite certainly not possess. 
This relationship between love and the value of the beloved holds 
not only for parental love, but quite generally. Most profoundly, per-
haps, it is love that accounts for the indispensably foundational and 
pervasively radiating value to us oflife itself. Why do we so confidently 
take self-preservation as a good reason for preferring one course of 
action over another? Staying alive does not have this importance for 
us because we believe that there is some great value inherent in our 
lives, or in what we are doing with them- a value that is independent 
of any attitudes or dispositions of our own. Even when we do think 
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our lives may be valuable in that way, that is not normally why we are 
so determined to hang on to them. We take the fact that something 
contributes to our survival as a reason for doing it just because, pre-
sumably as an outcome of natural selection, we are innately con-
stituted to love living. 
4. Since there is going to be quite a bit about love in this lecture, 
I really must try to make clear what I mean when I talk about it. How-
ever, I cannot help reminding myself here of a rather unsettling bit 
of advice that I understand was offered by the quantum physicist, Nils 
Bohr. He is said to have cautioned that one should never speak more 
dearly than one can think. Now it is notorious that the category of 
love is so inchoate that it is exceptionally difficult to think clearly about 
it. I won't even attempt to provide anything like a comprehensive ana-
lysis of the range of diverse and complex phenomena that it includes. 
Nevertheless, I do want at least to point in the general direction of 
the sort of thing I have in mind. 
The object of love is often a concrete individual: for instance, a 
person or a country. It may also be something more abstract: for in-
stance, a tradition, or some moral or non-moral ideal. There will fre-
quently be greater emotional color and urgency in love when the 
beloved is an individual than when it is something like social justice, 
or scientific truth, or the way a certain cultural group does things. But 
that is not always the case; and, in any event, it is not among the defin-
ing features of love that it must be hot rather than cool. 
Roughly speaking, love is a disinterested concern for the flourish-
ing of what is loved. That is, the lover desires the good of his beloved; 
and he desires it for its own sake, rc1ther than for the sake of promoting 
any other interests. Someone might care about social justice only be-
cause it reduces the likelihood of rioting; and someone might care 
about the well-being of another person just because she cannot be help-
ful to him unless she is in good shape. For the lover, on the other 
hand, the interests of his beloved are important in themselves, apart 
from any bearing they may have on other matters. 
Love frequently involves strong feelings of attraction, which are 
often supported by nattering descriptions of the beloved. However, 
these are not essential. As in other modes of caring, the heart of the 
matter is neither affective nor cognitive. It is volitional. Loving some-
thing has less to do with what a person thinks, or with how he feels, 
than with a complex structure of the will that consists in concern for 
the interests of the beloved. This volitional structure shapes the 
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lover's conduct with respect to whatever it is that he loves. It also guides 
him generally in designing and in ordering his purposes and his pri-
orities. 
It is important to avoid confusing love with various forms of infat-
uation,lust, obsession, and dependency. In particular, relationships 
that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very authentic 
or illuminating paradigms of love as I construe it. Relationships of 
those kinds typically include a number of distracting elements that 
do not belong to the essential nature oflove, but that are so vivid and 
so confusing that they make it nearly impossible to sustain a suitably 
focused analysis. It seems to me that, among relationships between 
humans, the love of parents for their infants or small children is the 
mode of caring that comes closest to offering recognizably pure in-
stances of love. 
There is a certain variety of concern for others that may also be 
entirely disinterested, but that differs from love because it is basically 
impersonal. Someone who is devoted to helping the sick or the poor 
for their own sakes may be quite indifferent to the particular identi-
ties of those whom he seeks to help. What qualifies people to be ben-
eficiaries of his charitable concern is not that he loves them. His 
generosity is not a response to their specific identities as individuals, 
but just to the fact that they are members of a relevant class. For some-
one who is eager to help the sick or the poor, any sick or poor per-
son will do. 
With regard to what we love, on the other hand, that sort ofindiff-
erence to the identity of the object is out of the question. The signi-
ficance to the lover of what he loves is not that of an instance or an 
exemplar; its importance to him is not generic, but ineluctably par-
ticular. It would make sense for a person who wants to help the sick 
or the poor to select his beneficiaries randomly from among those who 
are sick or poor enough to qualify. They are acceptable substitutes 
for each other, because the person does not really care about any of 
them as such. The situation of a lover is very different. There can be 
no equivalent substitutes for his beloved. It might really be all the same 
to someone moved by charity whether he helps this needy person or 
that one. It cannot possibly be all the same to the lover whether he 
is devoting himself disinterestedly to what he actually does love or to 
something else instead. 
Finally, it is a necessary feature of love that it is not under our vol-
untary control. What we love and what we do not love is not simply 
a matter of choice; it is not immediately up to us. In these matters, 
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we are constrained by a volitional necessity that limits the will and that 
we cannot elude merely by choosing to do so. 
5. Although the interests of his beloved are important to the lover 
in themselves, their importance to him is nonetheless conditional upon 
his love. It derives from his love, without which they would not have 
that importance. So far as he is concerned, however, their importance 
is inherent in them. That is what it means for him to care about them 
disinterestedly, or for their own sake. He does not consider them merely 
to have instrumental value as means to the acquisition of other goods. 
From his perspective, they have the terminal value that is definitive 
of things that are good intrinsically, and that are therefore suitable 
to be pursued as final rather than only as intermediate ends. 
There is among philosophers a recurrent hope that adopting cer-
tain final ends might be shown to be somehow a requirement of rea-
son. But this is a will-o '-the-wisp. Love is not the outcome of any process 
of reasoning. It is not dictated by the necessities of logic or of ratio-
nality. It is shaped by the circumstances ofindividual experience and 
character. The desirability ofloving one thing or another cannot be 
decisively evaluated by a priori methods. It can be measured only against 
requirements that are imposed upon us by other things that we love. 
The origins of normativity do not lie, then, either in the transient 
incitements of personal feeling or in the severely anonymous require-
ments of eternal reason. They lie in the contingent necessities oflove. 
These move us, as feelings do; but the motivations that love engen-
ders, unlike those of feeling, are not adventitious or (to use Kant's 
term) heteronomous. Like the universal laws of pure reason, they de-
rive from and express something that belongs to our most intimate 
nature. Unlike those of reason, however, the necessities of love are 
not impersonal. They are constituted by structures of the will by which 
the specific identity of the individual is most particularly defined. 
Of course, it is always possible to conceive loving things other than 
those that we do love, and to wonder whether that might not be in some 
way preferable. This does not mean that, in adopting and pursuing 
the final ends that love originates, our behavior is irresponsibly arbit-
rary. Those ends are not fixed by shallow impulse or gratuitous stip-
ulation, nor are they determined by what we merely happen at one time 
or another to find appealing. The volitional necessity by which we are 
constrained in what we love may be as rigorously unyielding to personal 
inclination and choice as the more austere necessities of reason. We 
cannot help loving what we love. That the direction of our practical 
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reasoning is governed by final ends that our love defines is not up to 
us. We cannot fairly be charged with arbitrariness, or with a willful 
lack of objectivity, since these things are not under our control at all. 
6. In the end, our readiness to be satisfied with loving what we do 
love does not rest upon the reliability of arguments or of evidence. 
It rests upon confidence in ourselves. This is not a matter of being sat-
isfied with the adequacy of our information, or of feeling secure in 
the exercise of our cognitive faculties. It is confidence of a more in-
timate variety. The stability of our final ends can be assured only inso-
far as we have confidence in the controlling tendencies and responses 
of our own volitional character. 
It is these non-voluntary tendencies and responses of our will that 
move us to love what we love. It is also these configurations of the 
will that most fully constitute our individual identities. The necessi-
ties of a person's will guide and limit his agency. They determine what 
he is willing to do, what he cannot help doing, and what he cannot 
bring himself to do. They set the boundaries of his practical life, and 
these define his shape as an active being. If recognizing what the char-
acter of his will constrains him to love makes him anxious or uneasy, 
the disturbance from which he suffers is a lack of confidence in what 
he himself is. 
Love is often unstable, of course, and vulnerable to circumstance. 
Although we cannot affect it directly, it may at times be within our 
power to bring about conditions that would cause us to stop loving 
what we love. But suppose that our love is so wholehearted, and that 
we are so satisfied to be in its grip, that we could not bring ourselves 
to undermine it even if ways in which it could be undermined were 
available to us. In that case, the issue of whether it is a good idea for 
us to love as we do is one that we could not take seriously. As a prac-
tical matter, it cannot effectively arise. 
Self-confidence consists in an integrity that can be undermined 
by radical discrepancies or disharmonies among the objects that we 
love. Disorders of that sort rupture the unity of the will and put us at 
odds with ourselves; they make it impossible for us to plot a steady voli-
tional course. But if there is no conflict among the requirements that 
our various loves impose upon us, there is no basis within us for 
opposition to any of them. In that case, any deliberate reluctance on 
our part to accede to the motivations that love engenders could be 
aroused only by resorting to some contrived ad /we maneuver. That 
would be arbitrary. On the other hand, it cannot be improperly arbit-
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rary for a person to accept the coherent impetus of a well-informed 
love, for he has no basis for declining to accept it and he cannot help 
being moved to do so. 2 
7. What we love is inherently important to us because of our love 
for it. There is rather different further point to be made here as well: 
loving itself is inherently important to us. Quite apart from our par-
ticular interest in the well-being of the various things that we happen 
to love, we have a more generic and an even more fundamental inter-
est in loving as such. Besides the fact that my children are important 
to me for their own sakes, there is the additional fact that loving my 
children is important to me for its own sake. Whatever burdens and 
distresses loving them may in the course of time have brought me, my 
life improved significantly when I began to love them. 
Why is loving as such so important to us? 'Why is a life in which a 
person loves something, regardless of what it is, better for him- other 
things being equal- than a life in which there is nothing that he loves? 
Part of the explanation has to do with the importance to us of having 
goals that we consider to be worth attaining for their own sakes rather 
than as being important to us only for the sake of other things. 
To the extent that we care about anything, we make various things 
important to us. This provides us with goals and ambitions, and thus 
makes it possible for us to perform actions that are not utterly point-
less or to no end. It supports activity that is meaningful in the rather 
minimal sense that it has some purpose. However, activity that is mean-
ingful only in this severely limited sense cannot be fully satisfYing or 
even fully intelligible to us. 
Aristotle observes that desire is "empty and vain" unless "there is 
some end of the things we do which we desire for its own sake. "3 It 
is not enough for us to understand that attaining a certain end is import-
ant to us because it will facilitate our attainment of some further end. 
We cannot finally make sense of what we are doing if none of our goals 
is important to us except for the sake of reaching other goals. There 
must be "some end of the things we do which we desire for its own 
sake." Otherwise our activity, regardless of how purposeful it may be, 
will have no real point. Its results cannot bring us genuine satisfac-
2Jt strikes me that there is a notable similarity between this defense of accepting the 
dictates oflove and Descartes's defense of accepting those of reason. I studied Descartes's 
work very carefully at one time, and it looks as though th;u may have left its mark. 
3 Niroma;Man Ethics, 1094al8-21 
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tion. The actions we perform will truly seem empty and vain, and we 
will tend naturally to lose interest in what we do. 
Practical reasoning is concerned with the design of effective means 
for attaining our ends. If it is to have a satisfactory foundation, we 
must have ends that we regard as something more than means to still 
other ends. There must be certain things that we pursue and that we 
value for their own sakes. It is easy enough to understand how some-
thing comes to possess instrumental value. That is just a matter of its 
causal efficacy in contributing to the fulfillment of some goal. But 
how do things come to have a terminal value that is independent of 
their usefulness in the pursuit of further goals? And how are our final 
ends established? 
It is love, I believe, that satisfies these requirements of practical 
reason. In loving we provide ourselves with ends that we care about 
for themselves rather than only as means. Love is the originating source 
ofterminal value. If we loved nothing, then nothing would be inher-
ently valuable, and there would be nothing that could serve us as a 
final end. By its very nature, loving entails both that we regard its ob-
jects as valuable in themselves and that we adopt those objects as our 
final ends. Insofar as love is the creator of inherent or terminal value, 
then, it is the ultimate ground of practical rationality. 
8. The relationship between the importance to the lover of lov-
ing and the importance to him of the interests of his beloved paral-
lels a curious aspect of the relationship that obtains generally between 
final goals or ends and the means by which they may be reached. The 
fact that something is effective as a means to a certain final end is or-
dinarily supposed to entail only that it possesses an instrumental 
value, which derives from the value of the end to which it is a means. 
It is ordinarily also supposed that the value of the final end is unequi-
vocally inherent in it and is in no way derivative from or dependent 
upon the value of the means that facilitate its attainment. Thus, the 
relationship of derivation between the value of a means and the value 
of its final end is generally understood to be asymmetric: instrumental 
values derive from the values of final ends, but not vice versa. 
This way of construing the relationship may appear to be a mat-
ter of straightforward common sense. Nonetheless, it rests upon a mis-
take. It assumes that the only value that is necessarily possessed by a 
final end, just in virtue of the fact that it is a final end, must be iden-
tical with the value of the state of affairs that is brought about when 
that end is attained. In other words, the importance to us of a cer-
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tain final end is supposed to be nothing but the importance to us of 
whatever would be brought about by successfully accomplishing that 
end. In fact, however, this does not exhaust the importance to us of 
our final ends. They necessarily have another kind of value as well. 
It is not only important to us to attain our final ends. It is also import-
ant to us simply to have final ends. The obvious reason for this is that 
otherwise there is nothing worthwhile for us to do. If we had no final 
ends, there would be no point in developing or in employing any in-
struments or means. If there were nothing at which we aimed for its 
own sake, no activity on our part could be truly useful. Without final 
goals, nothing that we do would have any real purpose. Having final 
ends is an indispensable condition, then, of engaging in activity that 
is truly useful or that has any real purpose. 
Similarly, while useful activity naturally has instrumental value, its 
value is not only instrumental. It is inherently important to us to en-
gage in activity that is instrumentally valuable. Regardless of what our 
aims may be, we need to have something genuinely useful to do. It 
may be possible to lead a life in which no activity has a definitive goal. 
In a readily intelligible sense, however, the life of a person who has 
no final ends is empty of significant meaning. 
9. It is an interesting question why a life in which activity may be 
locally purposeful but is nonetheless fundamentally aimless must be 
undesirable. What is necessarily so terrible about a life that is empty 
of meaning in this sense? The answer is, I believe, that an absence of 
final ends would drastically impair the reflexive connection to our-
selves in which our distinctive character as human beings lies. Inso-
far as we might nonetheless continue to sustain a certain level of 
active self-consciousness, we would be dreadfully bored. 
The avoidance of boredom is a profound human need. Our aver-
sion to being bored is not a matter simply of distaste for a rather un-
pleasant state of consciousness. The aversion expresses our sensitivity 
to a much more basic threat. It is of the essence of boredom that we 
don't care about what is going on. We therefore experience an atten-
uation of psychic vitality or li\'eliness. In its most familiar manifesta-
tions, being bored involves a reduction in the sharpness and focus of 
attention. The general level of mental energy diminishes. Our re-
sponsiveness to conscious stimuli flattens out and shrinks. Distinctions 
are not noticed and not made, so that our conscious field becomes 
increasingly homogeneous. As boredom progresses, it entails an in-
creasing diminution of significant differentiation within consciousness. 
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At the limit, when consciousness is totally undifferentiated, this 
homogenization is tantamount to the cessation of conscious experi-
ence altogether. When we are bored, in other words, we tend to fall 
asleep. Any substantial increase in the extent to which we are bored 
undermines, then, the very continuation of conscious mental life. That 
is, it threatens the extinction of the active self. What is expressed by 
our interest in avoiding boredom is therefore not simply a resistance 
to discomfort, but a quite primitive urge for psychic survival. I think 
it is appropriate to construe this as a variant of the elemental instinct 
for self-preservation. It is related to "self-preservation," however, only 
in an unfamiliarly literal sense - that is, in the sense of sustaining 
not the life of the organism but the persistence and vitality of the self. 
I shall not pursue the topic of boredom any further here. Instead, 
I shall simply take it for granted (as I suppose we all do) that activity 
we consider to be worthwhile is important to us for its own sake. It 
turns out, then, that instrumentally valuable activity may possess in-
trinsic value precisely because it is instrumentally valuable. By the same 
token, intrinsically valuable final ends tum out to be instrumentally 
valuable in virtue of the fact that they are essential conditions for real-
izing the intrinsically valuable goal of having something worthwhile 
to do. In other words, final ends are instrumentally valuable just be-
cause they are terminally valuable, and effective means to the attain-
ment of final ends are intrinsically valuable just because their 
instrumental value. 
The structure of the reciprocal relationships between the import-
ance to us of loving and the importance to us of what we love is sim-
ilar. Loving is important to us for its own sake, but it has that inherent 
importance only because it is devoted to the well-being of what we love. 
The inherent importance of loving depends upon the fact that,just 
as a means is subordinated to its end, the activity of the lover is sub-
ordinated to the interests of his beloved. As for the beloved, the lover 
cares about it for its own sake; it is inherently important to him. In 
addition, however, it derives an instrumental value for the lover from 
the fact that it is a necessary condition of his enjoying the inherently 
important activity of loving it. 
10. This may make it seem difficult to understand how the atti-
tude of a lover towards his beloved can be truly disinterested. The 
beloved appears plainly to serve him as a means to an end that is in-
trinsically important to him; it is a condition of his loving something. 
What he loves enables him to enjoy the benefit ofloving and to avoid 
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the intolerable emptiness of a life in which he has nothing to love. It 
appears, then, that the lover inevitably makes use of his beloved. How 
is it possible to avoid the conclusion that love is never really dis-
interested, but must invariably be self-serving? 
Well, suppose a man tells a woman that his love for her is what gives 
meaning to his life. Loving her, he says, is for him the only thing that 
makes living worthwhile. The woman is surely unlikely to feel- assum-
ing she actually believes this - that what the man is telling her im-
plies that he cares about her only because it makes him feel better to 
do so. She will not think that, because he recognizes that his love for 
her fulfills a deep need of his life, he must therefore be exploiting 
her to his own advantage and failing to value her for herself. 
It is possible, of course, that the man is a phony. It is also possi-
ble that although he honestly believes he is telling the truth about him-
self, the fact is that he doesn't really know what he is talking about. 
However, let us assume that his professions of love and of its import-
ance to him arc not only sincere but that they are also correct. In that 
case, it would be perverse to characterise him as merely using the woman 
as a means to satisfYing his own interests. The fact that loving her is 
so important to him is entirely consistent with his being unequivocally 
wholehearted and selfless in his devotion to her interests. The deep 
importance to him of loving her hardly entails the paradoxical con-
sequence that he does not genuinely love her at all. 
The apparent discrepancy or conflict between pursuing one's own 
interests and being selflessly devoted to the interests of another dis-
appears, in the case oflove, once it is understood that what serves the 
self-interest of the lover is, precisely, his selflessness. It is only if his 
love is genuine that it can have the importance for him that loving 
entails. Insofar as loving is important to him, maintaining the voli-
tional attitudes that constitute loving must be important to him. Since 
those attitudes consist essentially in caring selflessly about the well-
being of a beloved, there is no loving without this. The benefit of lov-
ing accrues to a person, therefore, only to the extent that he cares about 
his beloved for its own sake and not for the sake of any benefits he 
may derive from it. He cannot fulfill his own interest in loving unless 
he puts aside his personal needs and ambitions and concerns himself 
with interests other than his own. 
Any impression that this requires an implausibly high-minded self-
sacrifice can be dispelled by recalling that, in the very nature of the 
case, a lover identifies himself with what he loves. In virtue of this idem-· 
ification, the interests of his beloved are necessarily his interests too. 
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They are not so plainly other than his own at all. Far from being aus-
terely detached from the fortunes of what he loves, he is personally 
affected by how its interests fare. The fact that he cares about the flour-
ishing or well-being of his beloved means that he benefits as its interests 
are fulfilled and that he is harmed or diminished as its interests meet 
with frustration or defeaL The lover is invested in his beloved; he prof-
its by its successes and he suffers when it fails. To the extent that he 
invests himselfin or identifies with what he loves, its interests are iden-
tical with his own. It is hardly surprising, then, that for the lover self-
interest and selflessness coincide. 
11. Needless to say, the identification of the lover with his beloved 
is bound to be less than totally comprehensive. Their interests can 
never be entirely the same. The lover is certain to care about various 
things that have nothing much to do with what he loves. However 
important to him his beloved may be, it is unlikely to be the only thing 
that is important to him. There is generally a significant possibility, 
then, that disruptive conflict may arise between the lover's devotion 
to the well-being of his beloved and his concern for his other inter-
ests. Loving is risky. Among other things, lovers are vulnerable to 
profound distress if what they love does not do well. Therefore, they 
have to be careful. 
For an infinite being, who would be absolutely secure in its omni-
potence, even the most indiscriminate loving would be safe. God need 
not be cautious; there is no need for God, out of prudence or anxi-
ety, to forgo any opportunities for loving. On some accounts, the creat-
ive activity of God is mobilised by an entirely inexhaustible and 
uninhibited love, which moves God to desire a plenum in which every 
possible object of love is included. What God loves is simply Being, 
of any and every kind whatever. Since the divine love is necessarily 
unconditional and indiscriminate, the creation in which it is ex-
pressed has no motive or purpose beyond an utterly promiscuous urge 
to love without boundary or measure. Insofar as we think of God as 
love, we must suppose that the universe has no purpose or point ex-
cept simply to be. 
Finite creatures like ourselves, of course, cannot afford to be so 
heedlessly extravagant. Omnipotent agents are free of all passivity. 
Nothing can happen to them, and so they have nothing to fear. We, 
on the other hand, incur substantial vulnerabilities when we love. So 
we need to exercise a defensive selectivity and restrainL It is impor-
tant that we be careful to whom and to what we give our love. Our 
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lack of voluntary control over what we love is therefore a particular 
source of danger to us. The fact that we cannot freely choose what 
we love and what we do not love, means that we are susceptible to being 
more or less helplessly driven by the necessities oflove into investing 
ourselves unwisely and into volitional commitments from which we 
cannot withdraw and through which certain of our vital interests may 
be severely harmed. 
12. Notwithstanding the risks to which these constraints upon our 
will expose us, it seems to me that they also contribute significantly 
to the value that loving has for us. It is partly just because loving does 
bind our wills that we value it as we do. This may seem doubtful, given 
that we customarily represent ourselves as dedicated to the supreme 
value of freedom. However, the dissonance between desiring freedom 
and welcoming a submission to necessity is superficial. Its resolution 
lies in the apparently paradoxical, but nonetheless authentic, cir-
cumstance that the necessities with which love binds the will are them-
selves liberating. 
There is a striking resemblance here between love and reason. 
Rationality and the capacity to love are, perhaps, the two most highly 
prized features of human nature. The former makes available the most 
authoritative guidance in the conduct of intellectual life, while the lat-
ter provides us with the most admirably humane motivation when we 
acL Each imposes upon us a commanding necessity, and yet each brings 
with it a sense of enhancement rather than of impotence or of re-
striction. When we accede to the irresistible requirements oflogic or 
of love, the feeling with which we do so is not one of dispirited con-
finement or passivity. On the contrary, we characteristically experi-
ence in both cases - whether we are following reason or following 
our hearts- an expansion of ourselves. 
What happens, I believe, is that the encounter with necessity elim-
inates uncertainty and relaxes the inhibitions and hesitancies of self-
doubt. When reason demonstrates what must be the case, that puts 
an end to any hesitation concerning what to believe. Bertrand Rus-
sell refers to "the restfulness of mathematical certainty." It is restful 
because it relieves us from contending with disparate tendencies of 
belief and from struggling to make up our minds. As long as we are 
uncertain, we hold ourselves back. Discovering how things must nec-
essarily be enables us to give up the restraint we impose upon our-
selves when we do not know what to think. Then nothing stands in 
the way of steady and untroubled conviction, and we are freed to be-
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lieve unimpeded by inhibition. 
Similarly, the necessity with which love binds the will puts an end 
to our inability to settle definitively upon what to care about. In 
being captivated by our beloved, we are liberated from the impedi-
ment to choice and action that consists either in having no final ends 
or in being drawn inconclusively both in one direction and in another. 
The indifference and the wavering ambivalence that impair our ca-
pacity to choose and to act decisively are overcome. The fact that we 
cannot help being guided by the interests of what we love means that 
we no longer flounder aimlessly or hold ourselves back from whole-
hearted .dedication to a compelling practical course. 
The dictates oflogic or the requirements of the beloved supersede 
any contrary preferences or impulses of our own. Once the grip of 
those necessities has been imposed, it is no longer up to us to decide 
what to care about or what to think. We have no choice in the mat-
ter. They preempt the guidance of our cognitive or volitional activ-
ity, and make it impossible for us to control, in any way we may happen 
to like, the formation of our beliefs or of our will. It may seem, then, 
that the way in which the necessities of reason and of love liberate us 
is by freeing us from ourselves. 
That is, in a sense, what they do. The idea, of course, is nothing 
new. The suggestion that a person may be liberated through submitting 
to constraints that are beyond his immediate voluntary control is 
among the most ancient and persistent themes of our moral and re-
ligious traditions. "In His will," Dante wrote, "is our peace."4 The rest-
fulness that Russell reports having found through discovering what 
reason required of him evidently corresponds, at least up to a point, 
to the escape from inner disturbance that others profess having dis-
covered through accepting as their own the inexorable will of God. 
4 Pamdiso, iii.85. 
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